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CONSTITUTION DAY IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Alain L. Sanders* 
As violations of constitutional law go, this one might seem 
harmless or insignificant at first. No branch of the U.S. govern-
ment is seeking to upset the tri-partite balance of power, no per-
son's physical life, liberty or property is being threatened, and no 
fundamental human rights are being trampled. The goal behind 
what the U.S. government is doing appears commendable, and 
indeed, few Americans are likely to object. Still, no matter how 
admirable the purpose may be, the recent federal law imposing 
Constitution Day observances on schools nationwide creates se-
rious constitutional mischief. The validity of the government di-
rective appears all the more questionable as a result of the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision two years ago in Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights. 
The problematic government measure is Section 111 (b) of 
Title I of Division 1 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2005. The provision legislates an oxymoron. It attempts to order 
all federally-aided educational institutions in the country to 
celebrate American freedom and democracy. The brainchild of 
U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, the upper cham-
ber's self-proclaimed champion of the Constitution, the statute 
aims to attack the sorry state of historical and political knowl-
edge among the nation's youth. The clause, quietly tucked into 
the omnibus spending bill, mandates the following: 
Each educational institution that receives Federal funds for a 
fiscal year shall hold an educational program on the United 
States Constitution on September 17 of such year for the stu-
dents served by the educational institution. 1 
* Alain L. Sanders is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Saint 
Peter's College in New Jersey where he teaches a variety of courses in American gov· 
ernment, including Constitutional Law. (asanders@spc.edu) 
1. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447. 118 Stat. 2809 (2005). 
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The law first went into effect in the fall of 2005 and 
prompted federally-aided public and private schools around the 
country to unleash an avalanche of educational activities. From 
Princeton to Berkeley, colleges and universities assembled 
countless sets of scholarly panels to dissect everything from 
original intent, to presidential powers, to the First Amendment, 
to the Patriot Act. On campus after campus. politicians and 
judges were invited to pontificate on the virtues of American 
constitutionalism. In every state, primary and secondary school 
students participated in plays. readings. signings, debates, art-
works, contests, and elections to commemorate the drafting of 
the U.S. Constitution. In many places, educators also turned to 
museums, foundations, and think-tanks for ready-made pro-
grams specially cranked out to provide ideas and materials. 
The massive effort and its associated costs of time. person-
nel and resources have been rolled out, for the most part, every 
year since the law was passed. How long this level of commit-
ment can be maintained into the future is open to question. 
however. Section lll(b) appropriates no specific federal moneys 
for Constitution Day programs. requiring instead that the educa-
tional activities be squeezed out of existing school budgets. The 
provision attempts to enforce compliance by relying on the im-
plied threat to cut off the flow of federal funds to disobedient 
schools. Given the law's miserly and punitive construct, it seems 
only a matter of time before overburdened educators try to de-
velop strategies to get out from under the law's impositions. 
Many are likely to try to skirt the law with programs that are as 
thin as possible. Some, however, may be able to muster the 
courage to challenge Senator Byrd's directive head on, either by 
lobbying Congress or filing a lawsuit. 
The courthouse path appears particularly promising for the 
nation's colleges and universities.2 For these educational institu-
tions, a rich, all-American and very constitutional legal tradition 
has developed over the years that can be used to limit the gov-
ernment's power to commandeer academic curricula. This tradi-
tion, grounded in the First Amendment, was validated by the 
Supreme Court in the Rumsfeld decision. 
2. Whether elementary and secondary schools can successfully challenge Section 
lll(b) in court is much less certain. Existing jurisprudence under the spending clause. 
commerce clause. First Amendment. and Tenth Amendment does not provide a clear 
answer. 
2007] CONSTITUTION DAY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 689 
As an initial matter, Rumsfeld affirmed sub silentio the criti-
cal principle that colleges and universities enjoy a First Amend-
ment right of free speech. Without even questioning the premise, 
the Court unanimously entertained and ruled on the merits of a 
claim brought by an association of law schools and law faculties 
that alleged a violation of the institutions' freedom of speech. 
Specifically, the law schools challenged, as a breach of their right 
to speak out against the military's policies on gays, a statutory 
provision known as the Solomon Amendment which required, 
under threat of losing federal funds, that institutions of higher 
education provide military recruiters access to students "that is 
at least equal in quality and scope" to that "provided to any 
other employer.''' The Court ruled against the schools' position, 
but the justices did so on the grounds that the statute did not in-
vade the schools' right to speak freely, and thus did not breach 
the First Amendment rights possessed by the schools. "Nothing 
about recruiting," the Justices concluded, "suggests that law 
schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and nothing in the 
Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say 
about the military's policies. "4 
Rumsfeld's tacit recognition of a right of free speech for 
academia effectively re-affirmed a half-century of Supreme 
Court precedents on the issue. The modern Court's concern for 
academic free speech began in 1957 with Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, a case involving a state probe into the possible subversive 
content of a lecturer's presentations at the University of New 
Hampshire. 5 Striking down the investigative questioning of the 
lecturer as unauthorized, a plurality of four justices observed 
that academic freedom is "almost self-evident" and that "(t]o 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our col-
leges and universities would imperil the future of our Na-
tion .... Teachers and students must always remain free to in-
quire, to study and to evaluate .... "6 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice and former Harvard University law professor Felix 
Frankfurter delivered an even stronger endorsement of aca-
demic freedom. Quoting from a statement of South African 
scholars on open universities, Frankfurter famously declared for 
himself and another justice: 
3. Solomon Amendment. 10 U.S.C. § 9S3(b) (2005). 
4. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights. 547U.S. 47.65 (2006). 
5. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
6. /d. at 250. 
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It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and crea-
tion. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four es-
sential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' 
A decade later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
versity of the State of New York, the Court reiterated its solici-
tude for academic freedom, when it struck down as constitution-
ally too vague major portions of New York's teacher loyalty 
laws.' Writing for a Court majority this time. Justice William 
Brennan stated that academic freedom is ··a special concern of 
the First Amendment. which does not tolerate laws that cast a 
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 'The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the com-
munity of American schools. '"9 
Relying and building upon the Sweezy and Keyishian prece-
dents. Justice Lewis Powell's historic default opinion for the 
Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke recog-
nized academic freedom not merely as a right ''long ... viewed 
as a special concern of the First Amendment," 111 but also one of 
such ''paramount importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] 
mission" 11 as to justify a narrowly-tailored affirmative action ad-
missions program. Twenty five years later, in Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, a Court majority fully endorsed Justice Powell's position. 
Speaking through Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the high 
bench recognized the "constitutional dimension, grounded in the 
First Amendment, of educational autonomy"12 and concluded 
that it required a "degree of deference to a university's academic 
decisions" 13 broad enough to uphold a law school's narrowly-
tailored affirmative action plan. In other contexts, too, involving 
cases where students have challenged academic decisions as arbi-
trary under the Due Process Clause, the Court has sided with 
university officials, expressing "reluctance to trench on the pre-
rogatives of state and local educational institutions and our re-
7. /d. at 263 (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IJ-; SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (1957)). 
8. 385 u.s. 589,609 (1967). 
9. /d. at 603. 
10. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
11. !d. at 313. 
12. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306.330 (2003). 
13. /d. at 328. 
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sponsibility to safeguard their academic freedom. ·a special con-
cern of the First Amendment. ... t< 
The protection for academic freedom carved out by these 
precedents evidently raises significant questions about the con-
stitutionality of Section 111 (b) and its yearly mandatory educa-
tional program on the U.S. Constitution. The broad and gener-
ous language used to describe the principle and contours of 
academic freedom verbalize both a judicial aversion to govern-
ment intrusion and a judicial deference to the independent edu-
cational judgment of colleges and universities. Combined with 
the development of another strand of cases establishing a First 
Amendment doctrine against compelled speech- a doctrine 
which was clarified in the Rumsfeld decision- the Supreme 
Court's academic freedom jurisprudence renders the constitu-
tionality of Section 111 (b) fragile at best. On a purely First 
Amendment basis, Senator Byrd's law is highly suspect. Tacked 
on as an implied condition to a funding measure, the law does 
not shape up any better. 
The fountainhead ruling for the doctrine against compelled 
speech was the 1943 landmark decision in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette. I' Responding to the conscien-
tious objections of a Jehovah's Witnesses family, the Supreme 
Court struck down public school regulations that made it com-
pulsory for all students to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance.1" The Court decided it would be incongruous to rule 
"that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak 
his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to 
utter what is not in his mind." 17 In language that has reverber-
ated in judicial decisions, political speeches, and academic writ-
ing ever since he penned it, Justice Robert Jackson declared for 
the Court: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by work or act their faith 
14. Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (quot-
ing Keyishian v. Board of Regents 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). See also Board of Curators 
of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
15. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
16. /d. at 629-30. 642. 
17. /d. at 634. 
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therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an excep-
tion. they do not now occur to us. 1s 
In more recent times, the Court reiterated this general 
proposition in Wooley v. Maynard. The ''right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action," 
the Justices declared in 1977, "includes both the rirht to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. "1 Wooley up-
held the right of another Jehovah's Witnesses family to remove, 
on moral grounds. the New Hampshire motto "Live Free or 
Die" embossed on their car license plate. In words laden with 
significance for the constitutionality of Section 111 (b). the Court 
ruled: 
The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view 
as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individu-
alism. Of course. the State may legitimately pursue such in-
terests in any number of ways. However, where the State's in-
terest is to disseminate an ideology. no matter how acceptable 
to some. such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First 
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
'II 
message.-
Section lll(b )'s mandatory Constitution Day educational 
directive- although worded in neutral language- also attempts 
to instill a "proper appreciation" of the U.S. Constitution and its 
history and to make colleges and universities "the courier for 
such message ... The legislative history of the provision strongly 
suggests that honoring the Constitution and its principles was the 
primary purpose of the statute. Senator Byrd made it clear re-
peatedly on and off the Senate floor that he envisaged Constitu-
tion Day as a patriotic exercise. When he introduced the first 
version of his Constitution Day proposal, for example, he told 
his Senate colleagues: 
It is fitting and appropriate that we honor the document that 
established this government, and that we as a nation take 
steps to ensure that our Constitution and our system of gov-
ernment are known. understood, and cherished by the people 
they were established to serve.21 
18. /d. at 642. 
19. Wooley\. Maynard. 430 U.S. 705.714 (1977). 
20. /d.at717. 
21. 150 Co,G. REC. S9373 (daily ed. Sept. 20. 2004) (statement of Sen. Robert C. 
Byrd of West Virginia introducing his initial Constitution Day bill.) 
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And on the first Constitution Day in September 2005, Byrd told 
an audience at Shepherd University. in Shepherdstvwn, West 
Virginia: 
Each and every one of us has a responsibility to understand 
the Constitution and to view the decisions of our government 
through the prism of the Constitution .... Last year, I intro-
duced legislation to declare September 17 a national holiday. 
called "Constitution Day," to be celebrated with appropriate 
ceremonies, much as Flag Day is on June 14th. That legisla-
tion was not adopted, but an amendment that I offered to the 
omnibus appropriations bill was .... I hope that each year, 
each of you will renew your sense of devotion to our great na-
tion and increase your understanding of the mechanisms that 
make it great. 22 
Just as the state of New Hampshire admitted in Wooley that 
its license plate motto was intended to instill an appreciation of 
"history, state pride, and individualism," Senator Byrd's state-
ments can easily be interpreted to amount to a similar admission 
regarding the purpose of the Constitution Day mandate. Cer-
tainly a court intent on probing legislative history could easily so 
find-and conclude that the Barnette and Wooley decisions stand 
firmly in the way of carrying out such a purpose. The two deci-
sions state as clearly as can be that the government is barred by 
the First Amendment doctrine against compelled speech from 
forcing someone to be the courier of a particular view. More-
over, this bar is especially stringent in the context of colleges and 
universities, because of the deep and broad independent educa-
tional autonomy the Court has recognized these institutions also 
possess under the First Amendment right of academic freedom. 
Despite the resonant patriotic undertones in the legislative 
history of the statute, Section 111 (b) was carefully written- it is 
true-in language that is officially silent on the content of Con-
stitution Day activities so as to permit. at least on paper. pro-
grams advocating any point of view on the Constitution. Even 
so, the statute is not content neutral, and it does not comport 
with the principles of academic freedom recognized by the 
Court. The Byrd amendment intermeddles with the autonomy of 
colleges and universities to select independently what they desire 
to teach or say on September 17. The law mandates that no mat-
22. Senator Robert C. Bvrd. A Celebration of the Constitution of the United States 
(Sept. 16. 2005). available at .http://byrd.senate.gov/speeches/2005_september/constitution 
_shepherd.html. 
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ter what they normally choose to teach or say-and even if it in-
terferes with what they would otherwise normally choose to 
teach or say-colleges and universities must on that date address 
a particular subject: The United States Constitution. How such a 
directive can be reconciled, for example. with Justice Frank-
furter's freedom to decide ''what may be taught," or Justice 
Brennan's prohibition against the "pall of orthodoxy'' in the 
classroom, or Justice O'Connor's dimension of "'educational 
autonomy,'' is difficult to perceive. The very requirement that 
colleges and university devote time, space and resources for a 
Constitution Day program, regardless of their independent edu-
cational judgment, starkly contradicts the Supreme Court's un-
derstanding and definition of academic freedom and the associ-
ated right against compelled speech. 
The Rumsfeld decision confirms this conclusion. Rumsfeld 
involved the Solomon Amendment's requirement that federally-
aided colleges and universities open their doors to U.S. military 
recruiters to the same extent they do for other employers. A 
group of law schools challenged this open access requirement, on 
the grounds that the directive forced the schools to let in the 
military, and thus compelled them, in effect, to convey the mili-
tary's policies on homosexuals-a set of policies the schools con-
sidered discriminatory and contrary to their views. In an opinion 
by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court unanimously judged 
the law schools' First Amendment claim to be much too attenu-
ated. The Justices held that a law school's career placement ser-
vices are not inherently expressive, and that therefore, any mes-
sages expressed by employers allowed to recruit on campus 
through such services would not be confused as a message from 
the law school, and would not interfere with the conveyance of 
any contrary message the law school might wish to make when 
acting in its expressive capacity. 
The Rumsfeld decision clarified the critical point that com-
pelled speech jurisprudence hinges on the extent to which a 
speaker's expressive capacity is impacted. In the words of the 
Court, "the compelled-speech violation in each of our prior 
cases ... resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker's 
own message was affected by the speech it was forced to ac-
commodate. "23 The Court relied on several cases to illustrate this 
concept. Foremost among them was Hurley v. Irish-American 
23. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights. 547 U.S. 47.63 (2006). 
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Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 24 a case of particu-
lar relevance because it addressed a situation closely analogous 
to academic autonomy. 
Hurley was a case in which the Justices unanimously ruled 
that a Massachusetts anti-discrimination law could not require 
the organizers of Boston's Saint Patrick's Day Parade to include 
a gay rights group in their parade.=' To mandate inclusion of the 
group, the Court decided, would compel the parade organizers 
to convey a message they did not want to send.=" The Rumsfeld 
Court explained the Hurley holding this way: 
We concluded that because "every participating unit affects 
the message conveyed by the [parade's] private organizers," a 
law dictating that a particular group must be included in the 
parade ·'alter[s] the expressive content of th[e] parade" ... As 
a result, we held that the State's public accommodation law, 
as applied to a private parade. "'violates the fundamental rule 
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has 
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message. "27 
The Rumsfeld restatement of Hurley is significant because it 
identifies the reason for protecting the integrity of a parade, and 
by analogy, the integrity of an educational program, under the 
First Amendment. Like a parade, a college or university's educa-
tional program, consists of numerous "participating units," the 
alteration of any one of which will seriously "alter the expressive 
content" of the educational program. Those participating units, 
or components, consist of the various courses and activities-
curricular as well as extracurricular-that have been chosen by 
the college or university to provide what the institution considers 
the optimal experience for its students. 
These educational components lie at the heart of a college 
or university's expressive capacity. They identify the unique 
judgment and philosophy of each college and university. They 
carry the imprimatur of the institution, just as surely as, in Hur-
ley's words, the marching units of a parade carry the organizer's 
endorsement that the marching units are "worthy of presenta-
tion."2x The components that have been included in an educa-
tional program- as well as those that have been left out- thus 
24. 515 u.s. 557 (1995). 
25. /d. at 559. 
26. /d. at 581. 
27. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights. 547 U.S. at 63-64 (al-
teration in original) (citations omitted). 
28. Hurley. 515 U.S. at 575. 
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reflect the academic values, academic culture, and academic 
identity that define the institution. They embody and delineate 
the educational autonomy which the Court's First Amendment 
academic freedom jurisprudence seeks to protect from govern-
ment intrusion. 
The Byrd Amendment openly tries to invade this precinct 
of liberty. however. It attempts to alter the mix of educational 
components independently chosen by institutions of higher 
learning. And it does so by flatly ordering all colleges and uni-
versities within its reach to add a new educational component in 
their program every year-an annual Constitution Day activ-
ity- regardless of each institution's assessment of the educa-
tional merit of doing so. The directive baldly contradicts the 
principles articulated in Rumsfeld and Hurley. 
Accordingly, considered as a straightforward legislative pre-
scription, the Byrd Amendment falters on the steps of the First 
Amendment. It violates the academic freedom of every college 
and university affected to decide on its own whether or not to 
speak on a subject. The Byrd proviso is a funding measure, how-
ever. It achieves its command indirectly, by impliedly condition-
ing the receipt of federal funds on the establishment of a Consti-
tution Day educational program. The measure is constructed in 
this way, of course, to take advantage of Congress' power to ap-
propriate moneys for the "general welfare," and to maneuver 
around the absence of a specific enumerated congressional 
power to legislate directly on education.29 Over the years, the 
Court has upheld numerous conditional spending arrangements 
for enacting regulatory legislation with broad reach. But the Jus-
tices have not accepted every scheme. They have ruled that 
there are boundaries to the kinds of conditions Congress may at-
tach to a funding statute-and that one notable limit is the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions. This is a line which the Byrd 
Amendment, as a funding statute, oversteps because it requests 
that colleges and universities compromise their academic free-
dom in order to receive federal money. 
As a general proposition, the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions holds that Congress may not impose conditions which 
require recipients of federal aid to surrender a constitutional 
right in order to receive a federal benefit. In Rust v. Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court identified a critical feature of the doctrine, in 
cases involving private recipients of federal funds: 
29. U.S. Co~ST. art. I. § 8. cl. 1. 
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[O]ur ·unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in 
which the government has placed a condition on the recipient 
of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, 
thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the 
protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded 
30 program. 
For the Court, the distinction between conditions on a re-
cipient and conditions on a program has proved critical. The Jus-
tices have held that the first type of conditions-conditions on 
the use of funds that dictate what a recipient may or may not do 
outside the realm of a specific program-risk invading the re-
cipient's constitutional liberties. The second type-conditions on 
the use of funds that dictate what may or may not be done within 
a specific program-are usually acceptable, according to the Jus-
tices, because these conditions merely insure "that public funds 
be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized."31 Re-
lying on this distinction in the Rust case, for example, the Court 
approved as constitutional a measure that prohibited programs 
funded by the Public Health Service Act from providing abor-
tion counseling.'" In the high bench's view, the Congressional di-
rective did not violate the freedom of speech of the recipients-
the family planning organizations receiving the money- because 
it left them entirely free to pursue abortion-related speech and 
activities through separate and distinct programs not funded by 
the Act.'' 
In contrast, the Justices decided in FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California that a funding condition, prohibiting 
noncommercial educational stations from engaging in any edito-
rializing, violated the First Amendment.34 The general ban ap-
plied. to any stati~m receivin,9 a grant from ~he Corporation for 
Pubhc Broadcastmg (CPB). Here the Justices concluded that 
the boundless reach of the prohibition against editorializing, and 
the indivisible nature of station operations, created a situation 
that, in effect, regulated the stations- the recipients of the 
grants-rather than a specific, federally-funded program. No sta-
tion was able "to segregate its activities according to the source 
of its funding," and none had a "way of limiting the use of its 
30. Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173. 197 ( 1991) (emphasis in original). 
31. /d.at196. 
32. !d. at 177-78. 
33. !d. at 196-97. 
34. 468 u.s. 364. 366. 402 ( 1984 ). 
35. !d. at 366. 
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federal funds to all noneditorializing activities," the Court ex-
plained.'" Accordingly, the funding condition was struck down as 
an infringement of the stations' free speech rights. 
In its key essentials, Section lll(b)'s directive on Constitu-
tion Day strongly resembles the CPB directive on editorializing 
that was thrown out in the FCC case. Like the CPB order, the 
Byrd proviso was conceived and constructed as an across-the-
board, ali-or-nothing mandate on the recipient: Its command ap-
plies beyond the confines of any specific federal program; its flat 
edict becomes effective upon the receipt of any federal funds, ir-
respective of the amount or purpose of the funding. The Byrd 
proviso does not permit colleges and universities "to segregate" 
their Constitution Day activities "according to the source of its 
funding," nor is there a reasonable or practical way of "limiting 
the use of ... federal funds'' to Constitution Day activities only. 
If colleges and universities receive any federal moneys, they 
must engage in content-specific speech (a Constitution Day pro-
gram), just as the stations in the FCC case were bound to engage 
in content-specific speech (no editorializing), if they received 
any CPB grant. 
Thus, contrary to the guideposts laid down in the Rust case, 
the Byrd Amendment was not formulated as a compartmental-
ized federally-funded program-one that could be voluntarily 
accepted or rejected by a recipient on its merits, and one that if 
accepted by a recipient would leave the recipient free to speak 
out as it wished in any activity not funded by the program. In-
stead, the law was drawn as a broad-brush, undiscriminating 
condition that carries the implied threat to withdraw any or all 
federal funds, regardless of the purpose of the funds, from any 
recipient choosing to exercise its First Amendment academic 
right not to speak. The statute defies the Rust requirement of at-
taching funding conditions only to the relevant "particular pro-
gram or service" so that a recipient can remain free to engage in 
''protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded 
program.'' 
The Byrd Amendment thus fails all of the constitutional 
hurdles it must pass. The proviso runs counter to the broad prin-
ciples of academic freedom that have been recognized by the 
Court as inherent in the First Amendment. The proviso contra-
dicts the precedents that have established the existence of a First 
Amendment right not to speak. And the proviso violates the 
36. /d. at 400. 
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doctrine against the imposition of unconstitutional conditions in 
funding statutes. Section lll(b) fails all three of these hurdles 
for one rather simple reason: It does not follow proper constitu-
tional form. The statute commands institutions of higher learn-
ing to speak under the threat of losing all federal aid, instead of 
inviting them to speak by offering specifically targeted federal 
aid. By failing to respect the distinction between government 
compulsion and government encouragement- in a system 
founded on the bedrock principle of limited government author-
ity- the statute crosses into fatal unconstitutional territory. 
And so, in the final analysis, the Byrd Amendment is not 
the relatively innocent statute it seemed to be at first glance. The 
legislation is dangerous. It is dangerous because, of course, any 
government action that attacks a fundamental constitutional 
principle subverts the system. But the statute is especially dan-
gerous because the assault comes by pinching ever so mildly the 
nation's bastions of academic learning into proclaiming a benign 
message. After all, who in America could be against prodding 
the nation's colleges and universities to teach respect and appre-
ciation for the U.S. Constitution? The peril is that, if ignored, the 
Byrd proviso's method of coercion-the unconstitutional condi-
tioning of federal aid upon the surrender of academic freedom 
and the right not to speak- may be used not only today to dic-
tate a loose, well-intentioned, informational program about the 
Constitution. It may be used also tomorrow to dictate a uniform 
educational curriculum on anything the federal government con-
siders important or useful for the nation's youth. That is a dan-
gerous slope on which to tread and to slip. 
